I was never again to see Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the last Shah of Iran. Two days later he left with [his wife] Farah on an “official visit” to Aswan, Upper Egypt. He returned to the Nile valley in 1980, after incredible tribulations on both sides of the Atlantic, to die and be buried.[1]
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini arrived at Mehrabad airport here from Paris by a special chartered Air France plane at 9:10 local time after 15 years in exile. Millions of Iranians from all walks of life and across the country were lining up the 18-kilometre route that the Ayatollah’s motorcade took from the airport to the Behesht Zahra cemetery. . . . Tehran’s military governor yesterday gave the go ahead for three days of processions, marches and meetings starting today, to mark the return of Khomeini, reported radio Iran.[2]
On January 16, 1979, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Iran’s ruling monarch for nearly forty years, left his country for the last time. Two weeks later, on February 2, his bitter adversary and political usurper Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned to Iran after a long exile. This dramatic turn of internationally-significant events symbolizes the Iranian Revolution itself. When the Shah left, he did not leave alone; he took with him Iran’s immediate past as a modern, westernized monarchy. At the same time, when Khomeini arrived, he did not arrive alone; he brought with him Iran’s immediate future as a medieval, Islamized theocracy. Just as the Shah never again returned to Iran, neither, apparently, will his dream of the nation being ruled by a powerful Persian monarchy in the image of Cyrus the Great. And just as Khomeini never again left Iran, the strife he brought with him remains. Even today the nation is left to wrestle with the difficulties and contradictions embedded in a Constitution that was based largely upon his political theology.
Like any revolution, the causes of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 were multifarious and complex.[3] Also like any other revolution, the difficulties which entangled the Republic in the aftermath of the downfall of the Pahlavi dynasty were deep, intense, and often still unresolved. Despite the complexities, however, in the final analysis one ubiquitous theme emerges on either historical side of the Revolution, and that is beyond all doubt the Islamic revolution, apart from which the political upheaval in 1979 is inexplicable. Even more to the point, Iran’s Islamic revolution was specifically Shi’ite in nature, and moreover, was almost completely dominated by the mystical and legalistic theology of Ruhollah Khomeini. It seems safe to say, therefore, that at least at its most fundamental, theoretic level, the Iranian Revolution was first and foremost the result one man’s quest for a perfect Islamic state – legislated by Islamic law and administered by Islamic jurisprudents – a state instituted with the explicit mission of preparing the way for the messianic return of the so-called Hidden Imam, the eschatological hope of the Twelver Shi’ite sect. Accordingly, this essay will (1) provide a brief account of the major historical circumstances that precipitated the fall of the Shah and the subsequent rise of the Ayatollah; (2) survey the political theology of Khomeini, highlighting those aspects that address the role of the Islamic jurisprudents and the relation of that role to the concept of the Hidden Imam; and (3) examine the major elements of the Iranian constitution of 1979 in which the principle of velayat-e faqih, or “rule of the jurists,” was enshrined.
Imam Ruhullah Al-Musavi Al-Khomeini, better known in the West as the Ayatollah Khomeini, was born on September 24, 1902 into a family of religious scholars. His father was murdered when Khomeini was just five months old, and his mother and aunt, left with the responsibility for his early upbringing, both died when he was sixteen, leaving him to the care of his older brother Sayyid Murtaza.[4] In his late teens and early twenties, Khomeini studied under teachers who established him in religious traditions that included political activism as a major component.[5] By his early twenties, Khomeini was already beginning to distinguish himself, but initially not as the political leader for which he would later become internationally known, but as a devotional writer somewhat given to mysticism.[6] These early spiritual endeavors, as well as his teaching years at Qum[7] in the 1930s, helped build in Khomeini a spiritual reserve that would later be expressed in dramatic form leading up to and during the revolution of 1979.
Khomeini’s early years paralleled the establishment of the Pahlavi state. The Pahlavis came to power in 1921 through a military coup, led by Reza Khan, who declared himself Shah in 1923. Reza Khan ruled until 1941, at which time he was removed by Allied forces during World War II because of his pro-German sentiments. In his place, the British and Soviets installed his son, Mohammad Reza, as a constitutional monarch under a revitalized 1906 constitution. A failed coup attempt in 1953, thwarted with the help of the CIA, cemented Mohammad Reza’s control over the state, and at the same time more or less dissolved Iran’s ties with Great Britain and the U.S.S.R., and consequently tightened Iran’s relations with the United States.[8] During the 1960s and 1970s, as a result of the Nixon-Kissinger Doctrine, Iran became the single largest recipient of military aid from the U.S.[9]
Over the course of his thirty-eight year rule, according to professor of Persian and Islamic Studies Hamid Algar, Shah Mohammad Reza “transformed the Iranian monarchy into a dictatorship of the modern, totalitarian kind and made its chief internal aim the elimination of Islam as a political, social, and cultural force.”[10] This secular dictatorship made a deep impression on Khomeini, who first became publicly critical of the Pahlavi state as early as 1941.[11] Khomeini became more politically active in the early 1960s, protesting the Shah’s attempt to abolish the requirement that candidates for local assemblies be male and Muslim. In 1963, building upon a program he inaugurated in the 1940s, the Shah initiated a series of reforms known collectively as the “White Revolution.” Though widely perceived within Iranian society as an U.S.-led effort to prop up the Shah, the White Revolution was actually more Stalinist in its radical centralization of the economy and industry. Either way, upon the implementation of these reforms, the die was cast: the Shah and the Ayatollah from this point forward would be avowed and irreconcilable political enemies. Khomeini’s public denunciations of the White Revolution resulted in his arrest, which led to popular uprisings and protests. Algar marks this as “a turning point in the modern history of Iran. It established Imam Khomeini as national leader and spokesman for popular aspirations, provided the struggle against the Shah and his foreign patrons with a coherent ideological basis in Islam, and introduced a period of mass political activity under the guidance of the religious leadership instead of the secular parties.”[12]
In November 1977, Khomeini’s son Hajj Mustafa was assassinated, reportedly by a U.S.-backed security force in Najaf, Iraq, where the Ayatollah had been living in exile since 1965.[13] Algar asserts that as a result of this tragedy, “when the regime aimed its next blow against Imam Khomeini, discontent overflowed into rebellion, and rebellion, in turn, matured into revolution.”[14] On September 7, 1978, a day known to Iranians as Black Friday, martial law was declared and bloody clashes erupted in Tehran.[15] That same month, the Shah forced Khomeini to leave his exile in Iraq, whereupon he took up residence near Paris, France.[16] The Shah believed that under the scrutiny of the Western press, the Ayatollah would be exposed as “a crazy old man” and summarily discredited.[17] Ironically, Khomeini’s communication with his followers in Iran was even more effective from France than it had been when he had been in Iraq, just one hundred miles from the border of Iran. While in Paris, Iranians streamed to the Ayatollah, bringing to him news of domestic happenings, and, importantly, taking back with them taped messages Khomeini had recorded in order to promulgate his Islamist vision. Furthermore, far from being discredited, the Ayatollah was deftly able to exploit the Western media to help spread his views.
The Shah, meanwhile, had very nearly lost control of the nation through the unpopularity of his collectivist strategies and his tentative, ineffective leadership. In November 1978, in a shocking speech broadcast to the nation, the Shah not only feebly acknowledged – to the amazement of the public – that a revolution was in the making, but inexplicably offered himself as the revolution’s leader.[18] Iranian historian Ali Ansari calls this capitulation by the Shah:
one of the most peculiar if not singularly stupid political speeches in recent history. Up until 6 November, the vast majority of the Iranian public, outside the ideological vanguard of the opposition, had been unaware they were necessarily living through a ‘revolution’. Now, everyone, including staunch monarchists, confronted the unsavoury reality of imminent revolution and a Shah who, far from defending their interests, appeared intent . . . on ‘switching sides’ and leading it. . . . The Shah surrendered his state – from now on it was a matter of procedure.[19]
On January 16, 1979, with both his regime and his health failing, the Shah was forced to leave the country, ostensibly for a holiday of rest and recuperation. Ansari captures the apprehensive mood of the nation that day: “For Iranians, the departure of the Shah was a singular moment in their history. Ecstatic expressions of jubilation were mixed with a keen sense of anxiety.”[20] On February 2, the Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran after a fifteen year exile. Three days later, U.S. News and World Report described the escalating crisis:
After months of violence and turmoil, the fate of Iran rested in late January on a head-to-head test of strength between the religious fervor of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the resolve of the country’s pro-Shah military leaders. On one side was Khomeini . . . [who] demands that the Pahlevi dynasty be replaced by an Islamic republic, which he would advise and control. On the other side were Iran’s rightwing generals. Loyal to Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlevi, they back the government, determined to foil Khomeini’s attempt to set up what they fear would be a dictatorship of the Moslem clergy. Caught in the middle was Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar. All that prevented an immediate showdown between the two sides, even civil war, was his desperate attempt to put a shattered Iran back together so that the nation can decide its fate through constitutional means.[21]
By August 1979, despite a referendum in late March in which the Iranian people had overwhelmingly supported the idea of an Islamic republic, the situation had grown even worse as rival factions posed serious challenges to Khomeini’s fledgling leadership. Amidst all the chaos and bloodshed, however, President Jimmy Carter unwittingly provided an opportunity for Khomeini to consolidate his power and solidify his leadership. On November 4, 1979, against the advice of his senior officials, Carter allowed the ill and deposed Shah to seek medical attention in the United States. This act triggered intense alarm in Iran, where many doubted the Shah’s illness and also feared U.S. interference in Iranian internal affairs.[22] That day, which, quite significantly, also marked the traditional day of mourning among Shi’ite Muslims for the death of Husayn the grandson of the prophet Muhammad, five hundred Iranian students attacked the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, taking more than sixty American hostages, vowing not to release them until the U.S. government extradited the Shah back to Iran. Though the Ayatollah was not the architect behind the hostage-taking, he nevertheless made full political use of the crisis as well as its immediate aftermath.[23] Within a month, despite continued internal unrest and opposition, Khomeini had effectively established himself as Iran’s ruler, a position he would occupy with intensifying command until his death ten years later. As a profound testimony to his sudden international influence, in December Time Magazine named the Ayatollah its “Man of the Year” for 1979.
O you who believe! Obey God, and obey the Messenger and the holders of authority from among you.[24]
In 1962-3, while the Shah was attempting to implement the reforms of the White Revolution, the Ayatollah Khomeini, heretofore relatively unknown outside clerical circles, became an outspoken critic and opponent of the Shah’s imperialist, westernized regime. In retaliation, the Shah’s paratroopers attacked the seminary in Qum, arrested Khomeini, and deported him to Turkey, and later to Najaf, Iraq. Early in 1970, while in Najaf, Khomeini gave a series of lectures on the need for Islamic government which were significant in part because they were indicative of the growing trend among dissidents to provide clerical, rather than secular responses to the Shah. This increasing political involvement among the clergy would prove decisive by the time of the revolution in 1979 largely because the Shah, naively believing that the greatest threat to his power came from Marxists in the universities rather than Shi’ites in the mosques, had effectively silenced all dissent except that of the clerics.[25] Therefore, the ayatollahs, particularly Khomeini, remained relatively free – even if from afar – to spread their revolutionary ideas, especially among the religiously-inclined youth. C.M. Lake observes the Shah’s folly in overlooking the growing threat of the mosques: “[The mullahs] were a well-organized, cohesive unit, and the mosque had been excluded from the Shah’s severe repression, so that soon after the revolution a reporter noted that ‘Qom is the centre of a religious network reaching through 60,000 mullas to Iran’s entire Shi‘ite population.’”[26] It was principally through the agency of these religious leaders that Khomeini’s subversive ideas were disseminated to the public. This section will briefly examine the most relevant of those ideas, beginning with the foundational eschatological source: the Hidden Imam.
It is important to understand what exactly is meant by the term “political theology.” John W. Cooper provides a helpful definition: “At the most basic level, this term designates the intersection of politics and religion – or, more precisely, of political philosophy and theology. It implies, therefore, the search for a social and political vision with an essentially theological base.”[27] Khomeini’s philosophy represents a quintessential fusion of politics with theology. At the heart of his socio-political philosophy is the theological tenet known as the Greater Occultation of the Twelfth Imam. Authors Ali Rahnema and Farhad Nomani explain the relevant history:
Shi’i trace their disagreements with the Sunnis to the guardianship of the Islamic community after the death of Mohammed the Prophet. According to the Shi’i, the Prophet’s cousin and his son-in-law, Ali ibn-Abu Taleb, was his rightful successor. Basing themselves on the hadith, one of the main sources of Islamic knowledge and practice, the Shi’i argue that all the evidence indicates that Ali should have succeeded Mohammed. He was the first man to believe in Mohammed and the faith of Islam and was reputed to have known the Qur’an by heart.[28]
According to the Shi’a sect known as the Twelvers, after his death Ali was succeeded by Hasan, who was succeeded by Ali’s son Husayn, the martyr revered on November 4.[29] Nine more imams followed Husayn for a total of twelve. During the time known as the Lesser Occultation (872-939), the Twelfth Imam, Muhammad al-Muntazar, “disappeared” at the age of five from the physical plane but remained in communication with his followers through a succession of four appointed deputies. When the fourth deputy died and no successor was named, the age known as the Greater Occultation of the Twelfth Imam began and continues to this day.[30] Shi’i Twelvers, like Khomeini, believe that the Twelfth Imam will someday return and thereby establish universal Islamic rule.[31] Many expected that return centuries ago, but according to Khomeini, even though the Hidden Imam has been absent now for more than a thousand years and may not reappear for another thousand, Islamic order must not in the meantime be discarded: “Was everything pertaining to Islam meant to be abandoned after the Lesser Occultation? Anyone who believes so, or voices such a belief, is worse situated than the person who believes and proclaims that Islam has been superseded or abrogated by another supposed revelation.”[32] According to Khomeini, “the ordinances of Islam are not limited with respect to time or place; they are permanent and must be enacted until the end of time.”[33]
Khomeini, in fact, taught that the very essence of illegitimate government, which quite obviously included the one presided over by the Shah, was any nation-state not formed with the express purpose of imposing Islamic law in order to create a perfect society in preparation for the return of the Twelfth Imam. Whereas Sunni Islam preaches submission even to such illegitimate governments, Shi ‘ism, according to Khomeini, demands violent resistance. Khomeini could therefore claim that “if the Iranian people are now rising up against the Shah, they are doing so as an Islamic duty.”[34] Further, as Harvard sociologist Theda Skocpol notes, it is important to keep in mind that even as the Shi’ites await the return of the Twelfth Imam, according to tradition the Twelfth Imam likewise awaits “the coming of a perfect Islamic community as the telos of history.”[35] Reconciling these two, Khomeini “called upon the learned jurisconsults to create an Islamic government in which the religious laws would rule the land,”[36] charging the faqih, the religiously-informed jurisprudents, to administer the country and implement the sacred laws of shari’ah.[37] In sum, the existence of a virtuous Islamic state ruled by Islamic jurisprudents who faithfully executed Islamic law was the necessary condition for the eschatological reappearance of the Hidden Imam.
This section will examine three reasons Khomeini believed that the formation of an Islamic government was necessary. First, Khomeini contended that Islam called for more than just politically-marginalized legislators who expounded upon Qur’anic law; Islam demanded as well an executive who could enforce Qur’anic law. As proof, the Ayatollah reached back to the foundations of the faith: “When the Prophet appointed a successor, it was not for the purpose of expounding articles of faith and law; it was for the implementation of law and the execution of God’s ordinances. It was this function – the execution of law and the establishment of Islamic institutions – that made the appointment of a successor such an important matter that the Prophet would have failed to fulfill his mission if he had neglected it.”[38] Islamic law was “laid down for the purpose of creating a state and administering the political, economic, and cultural affairs of society.”[39] That is, “The Glorious Qur’an and the Sunna contain all the laws and ordinances man needs in order to attain happiness and the perfection of his state.”[40] Islamic law, thus, answers all of man’s practical issues including “his dealings with his neighbours, fellow citizens, and clan, as well as children and relatives; the concerns of private and marital life; regulations concerning war and peace and intercourse with other nations; penal and commercial law; and regulations pertaining to trade and agriculture.”[41] Even the provision of the one-fifth tithe, because of its great potential for raising revenue, was proof that government should be Islamic.[42] Hence Khomeini’s goal was not to politicize Islam, but more profoundly, to Islamize politics.[43]
To deny the need for the formation of Islamic government was to deny “the eternal validity of the faith itself.”[44]Commensurate with Khomeini’s belief that Qur’anic law was all encompassing in its ability to provide for order in society as well as the happiness and perfection of man was, of course, the need for the strict implementation of shari’ah.The key, once again, was that Islam did not just provide divines laws, but also provided the power, known as the vali amr, to execute those laws.[45] Khomeini describes the character and resolve required of the vali amr: “The Messenger of God was an executor of the law. For example, he implemented the penal provisions of Islam; he cut off the hand of the thief and administered lashings and stonings. The successor to the Prophet must do the same; his task is not legislation, but the implementation of the divine laws that the Prophet has promulgated.”[46] Again: “The Most Noble Messenger is the foremost example of the just ruler. When he gave orders for the conquest of a certain area, the burning of a certain place, or the destruction of a certain group whose existence was harmful for Islam, the Muslims, and mankind in general, his orders were just.”[47] Put simply, the vali amr is charged with governing in the same exact manner as the prophet Mohammad governed. As to the frequent accusation that such legal provisions are excessive and harsh, Khomeini retorted that such critics “are not aware that these penal provisions of Islam are intended to keep great nations from being destroyed by corruption.”[48] Islamic government was necessary, therefore, so that the qualified expert in the shari’ah would have actual executive power to enforce the law intended for the perfection of both man and state.
Second, Islamic government was necessary so that a massive cultural revolution could be undertaken, one which entailed the Islamization of all judicial systems, government offices, and especially the universities. It is with the latter that one can perhaps most clearly see the exclusivist and isolationist tendencies of Khomeini’s philosophy. The Ayatollah explicitly rebuffed any insinuation that by “Islamizing” the educational system that he intended a government-enforced acquiescence to a two-truths epistemology, like that embraced by some medieval Muslim philosophers. Such would foolishly “regard every science as consisting of two sectors, one Islamic and the other non-Islamic, so that, for example, there is an Islamic mathematics and a non-Islamic mathematics, or an Islamic physics and a non-Islamic physics.”[49] Instead, Khomeini’s complaint was that the Iranian universities had heretofore been nothing more than the handcrafted tools of Western nations used to exploit the intellectual resources of the educated class: “The universities do not impart an education that corresponds to the needs of the people and the country; instead they squander the energies of whole generations of our beloved youth, or oblige them to serve the foreigners.”[50] Khomeini demanded that the universities be made “Islamic” in the sense that they would be “autonomous, independent of the West and independent of the East, so that we have an independent country with an independent university system and an independent culture. . . . What we fear is cultural dependence . . . .”[51] In sum, Khomeini’s cultural revolution was a radical reversal of the Pahlavi-style dependence on and subservience to imperialist governments like America, and a total subordination of all institutions to the Islamic ideal of fierce national independence and purely Qur’anic ideals.[52] Such a reversal called for and required the force of a government bound to shari’ah.
Finally, Islamic government was necessary so that Khomeini could achieve his utopian ideals in both domestic and foreign affairs. Every single one of man’s needs has been addressed by Islam, and therefore, if man is to be happy and the nation to be virtuous, all non-Islamic systems of government (kufr)[53] must be overthrown and the provisions of shari’ah must be executed and enforced. Islamist government is not intended merely to repress or punish evil; positively it is meant “to fashion true and complete human beings, complete in all their dimensions.”[54] Thus, for the good of man, all corrupting influences must be categorically eliminated – a perfect, Islamic social environment must be engineered because “a believing, pious, just individual cannot possibly exist in a socio-political environment of [any other] nature and still maintain his faith and righteous conduct. . . . We have in reality, then, no choice but to destroy those systems of government that are corrupt in themselves and also entail the corruption of others, and to overthrow all treacherous, corrupt, oppressive, and criminal regimes.”[55] Thus Khomeini charged his fellow clerics: “Know that it is your duty to establish an Islamic government.”[56]
Khomeini did not limit the utopian reach of Islamist government to the domestic affairs of Iran, but considered it universally applicable to the entire Islamic community (umma), in which there can be no territorial or ethnic distinction.[57] In contrast, “the imperialists and the tyrannical self-seeking rulers have divided the Islamic homeland. They have separated the various segments of the Islamic umma from each other and artificially created separate nations.”[58] This has been done in part by the imposition of an unjust economic order that divided people in two classes: the oppressed and the oppressors.[59] But in reality, the only legitimate distinction is the one between the believer (mu’men) and the disbeliever (kafar).[60] In a declaration given on April 1, 1979, the First Day of God’s Government, Khomeini boasted to his fellow Iranians that the Revolution was at last sweeping into power a government that recognized this basic Muslim belief: “Blessed for you be this government that knows no difference of race, whether between black and white, or between Turk, Persian, Kurd, and Baluch. All are brothers and equal; nobility lies only in the fear of God.”[61] This, of course, was in direct contradistinction to the government of the Shah, the man who “claimed to be an Iranian before he was a Muslim (which itself it contrary to religion).”[62]
One need look no further than the failure of the Muslims to recognize this basic Qur’anic truth, not to mention the incompetence of those who currently rule over the Muslims, to understand why the Jews have been able to occupy Muslim lands.[63] Islam, the Ayatollah claimed, has historically been forced to contend with the propaganda of the Jews (“may God curse them”[64]), who have joined with the imperialists in the crusade to distort the truth of Islam.[65] Khomeini’s program for combating such distortion was succinct and, not surprisingly, violent: “In our own city of Tehran now there are centers of evil propaganda run by the churches, the Zionists, and the Baha’is in order to lead our people astray and make them abandon the ordinances and teachings of Islam. Do we not have a duty to destroy these centers that are damaging to Islam?”[66]
Khomeini’s tragically deficient foreign policy was more than just anti-Zionist.[67] It was intentionally isolationist and particularly concerned with reversing the Pahlavi’s subservience to foreign powers both East and West, even to the detriment of the nation’s well-being. As Schirazi points out, Khomeini’s truncated foreign policy was founded upon such simplistic slogans as, “Neither West nor East!” or “Disavowal of unbelief!”[68] Rahnema and Nomani summarize that Khomeini’s Islamic Republic was in a word “anti-non-Islamic. It made no difference if the non-Islamic state was a truly proletarian, democratic, imperialist or fascist state.” Therefore, the Ayatollahs’ utopian vision required that “society had to be closed, cleansed, and then opened up in order to export the revolution.”[69] This could only be accomplished through the establishment of an authentic Islamic government.
Khomeini exhorted the clerics (ulama) to be forceful apologists for the Islamic order. They must teach the people, particularly the young, that Islamic law was not obsessed merely with “studying the questions of menstruation and parturition” by which the people would “draw the conclusion that religion must be separate from politics.”[70] Indeed: “This slogan of the separation of religion and politics and the demand that Islamic scholars not intervene in social and political affairs have been formulated and propagated by the imperialists; it is only the irreligious who repeat them.”[71]Here Khomeini is no doubt aiming his criticism directly at the Shah, who, as Skocpol puts it, “contemptuously . . . supposed that the old-fashioned, ‘turban-headed’ clerics would silently fade from the scene as the inevitable course of modernization progressed.”[72] In 1976, the Shah would reconfirm his contempt for the clergy when he replaced the official Islamic calendar with an imperial one. Ehsan Naraghi, founder of Tehran University’s Institute of Social Studies and Research and frequent advisor to the Shah, explains that the Shah’s motive was to “emphasize Iran’s non-Islamic past and to identify himself with Cyrus the Great, seeking thereby to make a distinction between Iranian and Arab history and to diminish the influence of Islam on the Iranian people.”[73] To counter the Shah’s secularism, Khomeini instructed the clergy to define and defend the political and cultural relevance of Islam.[74]
Khomeini acknowledged in the early 1970s that the overthrow of the Shah and the installation of Islamic government might have to wait for the next generation. Thus he sought to spread his revolutionary ideals among the young, especially in the universities.[75] One tactic that Khomeini exploited to prove his legitimacy to the youth was his intentional display of asceticism to contrast with the pomp and vanity of the monarchy. To the clerics he exhorted: “We must become more ascetic than before and completely shun the goods of this world.”[76] Naraghi informed the Shah personally how this tactic was helping the Ayatollah to win hearts and minds: “They believe that by following Khomeini they will move toward a more egalitarian society and that there will no longer be any differences between people – not, at any rate, in terms of living standards. They look at the way the religious people live and compare its austerity and simplicity with the life-style of the Westernized class with its extravagance and ostentation.”[77] Here one finds another powerful symbol of the Revolution: the simplicity of Qum contrasted with the excesses of Tehran.[78]
Khomeini claimed that “today we have 700 million Muslims in the world, 170 million or more of whom are Shi ‘is. They are all ready to follow us, but we are so lacking in resolve that we are unable to lead them.”[79] The reason for the apathy was that the clerics had passively allowed themselves to be marginalized by those who “plant in your minds the suggestion that politics means lying and the like, so that you lose all interest in national affairs and they can proceed with their business undisturbed, doing whatever they like and indulging all their vices.”[80] Khomeini’s program of action, therefore, was the mobilization of Qom, the symbolic center of pure Islam for the Iranian Shi’ites, to rise to the occasion and forcefully overthrow the tyrannical regime of the Shah, for “in the Qur’an, God Almighty has forbidden men to obey the taghut – illegitimate regimes – and encouraged them to rise up against kings, just as He commanded Moses to rebel.”[81]
At the heart of Khomeini’s political theology is a concept known as velayat-e faqih, or “rule of the jurists.” It is from this controversial concept, with its basic theological presupposition of the Greater Occultation of the Twelfth Imam, that Ayatollah Khomeini drew his political legitimacy.[82] Khomeini believed the validity of this concept to be transparent: “. . . anyone who has some general awareness of the beliefs and ordinances of Islam will unhesitatingly give his assent to the principle of the governance of the faqih as soon as he encounters it; he will recognize it as necessary and self-evident.”[83] Three major elements of velayat-e faqih will be noted here. First, velayat-e faqih is a form of constitutionalism – a rule of law. Not to be confused with a western-style constitutionalism in which laws are made with the approval of the majority, however, Islamic government is “constitutional in the sense that the rulers are subject to a certain set of conditions in governing and administering the country, conditions that are set forth in the Noble Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Most Noble Messenger(s). . . . Islamic government may therefore be defined as the rule of divine law over men.”[84] In the Islamic state, the only legitimate Legislator was God Almighty. And because the law came directly from the Sacred Legislator of Islam, it therefore “has absolute authority over all individuals and the Islamic government.”[85]
That in turn leads to a second principle of velayat-e faqih: while the jurists do not enjoy a religious status equal to the Prophet or the Imams, they do possess functional equality as executors of the law. The Shah, as has been noted, considered Khomeini and the ulama to be culturally backwards and politically irrelevant, and he sought to move the secular nation further away from the influence of Islam. He therefore endeavored to convince the public that the clerics were obsessed with ritualistic laws that had little or no bearing on the public square. Khomeini countered by enjoining his fellow clerics to master the world of politics, even if that meant subordinating theological studies: “Knowledge of the law and justice, then, constitute fundamental qualifications in the view of the Muslims. Other matters have no importance or relevance in this connection. Knowledge of the nature of angels, for example, or of the attributes of the Creator, Exalted and Almighty, is of no relevance to the question of leadership.”[86] The jurists, then, have to become master interpreters and executors of Islamic law. But even beyond such political mastery, they also have to demonstrate the courage and conviction to enforce the law at any cost, even if that means cutting off the hand of one of their own offending sons or daughters to prove their impartiality.[87] Despite not being his religious equal, the faqih must nonetheless inflict the punishments of the law with the same resolve as did the prophet Mohammad.[88]
The third element of velayat-e faqih is the identity of the jurist as a trustee. Khomeini explains the significance: “The meaning of ‘trustee,’ then, is that the fuqaha execute as a trust all the affairs for which Islam has legislated – not that they simply offer legal judgments on given questions.”[89] The Islamic Republic is a rule of divine law by which freedom for all (believers) is guaranteed: “the security for all is guaranteed by law, and law is their refuge. Muslims and the people in general are free within the limits laid down by the law; when they are acting in accordance with the provisions of the law, no one has the right to tell them, ‘Sit here,’ or ‘Go there.’”[90] The law is the source of and security for liberty. The faqih, as the sole competent guardian of divine law, alone has the capacity to prevent tyranny and despotism. In other words, the faqih is the trustee of the people’s liberty and well-being. The prevention of tyranny – tyranny being the very essence of any non-Islamic government – was, in fact, to be one of the primary roles of the trustees in the new Republic.[91] To allay any fears that the faqih himself could become a tyrant, Khomeini provides this reminder: “the faqih who possesses the attributes mentioned in the Constitution cannot, in the very nature of things, be a tyrant.”[92] Khomeini’s argument here, one that helped him to eventually secure near-absolute power, borders on circularity. Though obviously more nuanced than this, the argument goes something like this: the faqih will not oppress because they will closely follow Islamic law. Further, the faqih will follow the law because of their character and expertise. Otherwise they could not have become a jurist. Despite Khomeini’s assurances that the trustees were alone able to prevent tyranny, Khomeini exploited this very line of reasoning to become a tyrant himself.
Khomeini could confidently proclaim April 1, 1979 as the “First Day of God’s Government,” because in the national referendum held March 30-31, ninety-eight percent of the people had voiced their support for the Revolution.[93]Drawing upon this overwhelming mandate, Khomeini triumphantly proclaimed: “I declare to the whole world that never has the history of Iran witnessed such a referendum, where the whole country rushed to the polls with ardor, enthusiasm, and love in order to cast their affirmative votes and bury the tyrannical regime forever in the garbage heap of history.”[94]The trouble, however, was that the referendum called for the people “simply to decide ‘whether the form of the future state would be the Islamic Republic or not.’”[95] Intentionally obfuscated was the precise meaning of velayat-e faqih. The Iranians, sadly, had been grossly misinformed about the actual form of the proposed government and the role of the Islamic clergy.[96] Khomeini had previously spelled out his particular concept of velayat-e faqih in the series of lectures he gave in Najaf in 1970. Eight years later in Paris, however, he repeatedly assured curious reporters that the ulama would exercise only a supervisory role and would not themselves govern. Furthermore, he unequivocally repudiated the notion that he intended to occupy a position in the new government, maintaining this posture even after his return to Tehran in February 1979. This disinformation campaign reached its zenith in late March, just days before the national referendum.[97] Schirazi identifies the sinister objective: “Once the idea of an Islamic state was accepted, it was possible to move towards what had been the real goal all along, namely pushing through the concept of velayat-e faqih. This meant creating a situation in which the preliminary draft of the constitution could be undermined and a new text substituted.”[98] By June, Khomeini had assembled a strong enough coalition that he could begin propagating velayat-e faqih on the public. The propaganda included, of course, rhetorical and personal attacks against any who opposed, as well as forcible curtailment of any democratic process that might derail his effort.[99]
In the Constitution that was eventually ratified in December 1979, if the actual wording of the text, says Schirazi, “does not establish velayat-e faqih with this degree of purity [the absoluteness Khomeini aspired], it is nevertheless clear that the pervading spirit of the document expresses the concept of an absolute hierocracy. This form of velayat-e faqihcorresponds to the image sketched in Khomeini’s book on the subject which appeared a decade before the revolution. In that book, the power of the ruling jurist is also absolute.”[100] Three articles of the Constitution are especially helpful in identifying those provisions which were heavily influenced by Khomeini’s concept of velayat-e faqih and the Greater Occultation of the Twelfth Imam. Article 2, for example, reveals several fundamental Islamic beliefs that were enshrined in the legal system of Iran, such as:
(1) The One God (as stated in the phrase “There is no god except Allah”), His exclusive sovereignty and the right to legislate, and the necessity of submission to His commands;
Divine revelation and its fundamental role in setting forth the laws;
(2) The return to God in the Hereafter, and the constructive role of this belief in the course of man’s ascent towards God;
(3) The justice of God in creation and legislation;
(4) Continuous leadership (imamah) and perpetual guidance, and its fundamental role in ensuring the uninterrupted process of the revolution of Islam;[101]
Article 5 mentions the faqih and his relation to the Hidden Imam:
During the Occultation of the Wali al-Asr (may God hasten his reappearance), the wilayah and leadership of the Ummah devolve upon the just (‘adil] and pious [muttaqi] faqih, who is fully aware of the circumstances of his age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrative ability, will assume the responsibilities of this office in accordance with Article 107.[102]
Finally, Article 107 provides:
After the demise of the eminent marji’ al-taqlid and great leader of the universal Islamic revolution, and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatullah al-‘Uzma Imam Khomeyni – quddisa sirruh al-sharif – who was recognized and accepted as marji’ and Leader by a decisive majority of the people, the task of appointing the Leader shall be vested with the experts elected by the people. . . . The Leader thus elected by the Assembly of Experts shall assume all the powers of the wilayat al-amr and all the responsibilities arising therefrom. The Leader is equal with the rest of the people of the country in the eyes of law.[103]
Several relevant points can be noted about these constitutional provisions, particularly Articles 5 and 107. First, according to Article 5, the rule of the faqih[104] is explicitly predicated upon the “Occultation of the Wali al-Asr,” that is, the mystical notion of the Greater Occultation of the Twelfth Imam, the age which began roughly one thousand years ago and continues to this day. That is, in accordance with Khomeini’s political theology, the faqih was the guardian of the Islamic state and the supervisor of the proper implementation of Islamic law in lieu of the physical presence of the Hidden Imam. This is the fundamental source of political legitimacy in the Islamic Republic.
Second, Article 5 anticipates the eventual return of the Imam, presumably contingent upon the effective establishment of the perfect Islamic state. Third, Article 107 provides for the power of the wilayat al-amr, that is, the vali amr, the executor of Islamic law. Recall that Khomeini explained in his 1970 lectures that the vali amr was religiously inferior to the Prophet and the Imams, but was by necessity and duty their functional equivalent. That Article 107 qualifies this authority by claiming that the “Leader is equal with the rest of the people of the country in the eyes of law,” is quite misleading. In time, Khomeini was able, quite expediently, to define as “non-Muslim” or an adherent to “American Islam” anyone who failed to accept his supreme powers.[105] Thus, Khomeini eventually assumed the role of uncontested dictator, going so far as to declare in 1988 the rule of velayat-e faqih to be absolute.[106] This was accomplished largely “by the progressive allocation of almost all leading government posts to the clergy and many other less important posts to their lay supporters or those related to them by family ties.”[107] To be sure, upon Khomeini’s death in 1989, his successor could not maintain this absolutism. But this was most likely due to the fact that Hojjat-ol Islam Ali Khamene’i, unlike Ruhollah Khomeini, “lacked the necessary religious qualifications for the post and the charisma of his predecessor.”[108] Once the austere and mystical Khomeini was no longer around to accrue power to himself, the fundamental contradiction in the Constitution between Islamic legalist and non-Islamic secular elements would eventually surface in a more overt power struggle between the clerics and those who championed the sovereignty of the people.[109]
Religion and politics, wrote Ruhollah Khomeini, were to be united in the twentieth century in the same way and for the same purpose that they were in the seventh. Any perceived or practiced distinction between the two was the sine qua non of illegitimate government. Khomeini’s attempted realization of that idealistic belief in the Iranian Revolution and Constitution of 1979 meant the violent dissolution of the modernist, westernized dynasty of the Pahlavis and the implementation of a medieval theocratic order bound to the shari’ah. Khomeini’s pre-modern theocracy, however, has been unable to fully penetrate the hearts of the Iranian people. Under the Shah’s regime, for all of its apparent shortcomings, the people still benefited from “exterior” freedoms, that is, material well-being, even if their “interior” freedoms were repressed. Under the Ayatollah the people were deprived of both.[110] In reality, Khomeini’s utopian ideal of the state being entirely defined by and conformed to the shari’ah was never fully realized. Schirazi explains:
On the level of legislation the Islamic Republic has from the beginning experienced a separation rather than a unity of religion and the state. On another level the process has been supplemented by a development which may be characterized as a separation of the clergy from their religious functions. While members of the clergy have held on to their turbans and robes ever more tenaciously, they have at the same time increasingly taken over the offices of state and thus neglected their religious duties. Indeed, they have been transformed into state functionaries.[111]
It seems therefore, that one man’s quest for the perfect Islamic state ultimately failed on at least two accounts. Not surprisingly, the abstract ideal of a state ruled by Islamic law proved impossible to implement in the real world, especially one that had for several generations experienced such a high degree of western influence. Moreover, the personal spiritual reserve that helped Khomeini lead his fellow clerics in overthrowing the “illegitimate” government of the Shah seems lacking in his clerical successors. If Schirazi is correct, the cause of this of deficiency may very well be found, ironically, in the overwhelming responsibilities the clerics have assumed as a result of the system that they themselves helped to create. In the end, it does not seem to be the case that when the Shah left his homeland for the last time that he permanently took all that he represented away from the Iranian people. The remains of a 2,500 year old history have not been easily interred. On the other hand, its does appear correct to say that the Ayatollah Khomeini, upon his return from exile, brought back with him to Iran the permanent baggage of a legalistic political theology filled with irresolvable contradictions and utopian impossibilities. As a consequence, if a prerequisite for the return of the Hidden Imam involves the effective implementation of a perfect Islamic state, then those who await him seem to have no choice but to continue waiting.
Ansari, Ali. M. Modern Iran Since 1921: The Pahlavis and After. New York: Pearson Education Limited, 2003.
Cooper, John W. the Theology of Freedom: the Legacy of Jacques Maritain and Reinhold Niebuhr. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1985.
Corduan, Winfried. Neighboring Faiths: A Christian Introduction to World Religions. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1998.
Kamrava, Mehran. Revolution in Iran: The Roots of Turmoil. New York: Routledge, 1990.
Khomeini, Imam. Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini. Trans. and annotated by Hamid Algar. Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, 1981.
________. Governance of the Jurist (Velayat-e Faqeeh): Islamic Government. Trans. by Hamid Algar. Tehran: Iran Chamber Society.
Khomeini, Ayatollah. “The Necessity for Islamic Government.” In Lloyd Ridgeon, ed. Religion and Politics in Modern Iran: A Reader. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005.
Lake, C.M. “The Problems Encountered in Establishing an Islamic Republic in Iran 1979-1981.” Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies 9, no. 2 (1982): 141-70.
Moin, Baqer. Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah. New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999.
Naraghi, Ehsan. From Palace to Prison: Inside the Iranian Revolution. Trans. By Nilou Mobasser. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1994.
Rahnema, Ali and Farhad Nomani. The Secular Miracle: Religion, Politics & Economic Policy in Iran. New Jersey: Zed Books, Ltd., 1990.
Schirazi, Asghar. The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic. Trans. by John O’Kane. New York: I.B. Tauris, 1998.
Skocpol, Theda. “Rentier State and Shi’a Islam in the Iranian Revolution.” Theory and Society 11, no.3 (May 1982): 265-83.
Website of the Iran Chamber Society: www.iranchamber.com
[1] Ehsan Naraghi, From Palace to Prison: Inside the Iranian Revolution, trans. by Nilou Mobasser (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1994). The date was January 14, 1979. The Shah left Iran for the last time on January 16.
[2] Xinhua General Overseas News Service, February 2, 1979. Source: LexisNexis.
[3] Mehran Kamrava deduces four clusters of causes: (1) drastic reductions in the state’s powers and authority due to internal and internal and international developments; (2) the activities of opposition groups amid the political weaknesses of the state; (3) the appearance of social conditions conducive to the dissemination of revolutionary sentiments throughout society; and (4) the effective development of links between the various opposition groups and those classes whose support they sought. Revolution in Iran: The Roots of Turmoil (New York: Routledge, 1990), 12-13.
[4] Imam Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, translated and annotated by Hamid Algar (Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, 1981), 13.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid., 14.
[7] Or, Qom.
[8] Kamrava, 15-16.
[9] Ibid., 30-31. The doctrine, aimed at maintaining stability in this critical region during some of the tensest years of the Cold War, was abandoned by President Carter once he took office, ostensibly as a way to chastise the Shah for his abysmal human rights record. See Kamrava, 131-32.
[10] Islam and Revolution, 14. Translator’s introduction.
[11] Ibid., 15.
[12] Ibid., 17.
[13] The official cause of death was ruled as a heart attack.
[14] Islam and Revolution, 19.
[15] Kamrava, 36.
[16] Islam and Revolution, 20. Under pressure from President Carter, the Shah was forced to avoid taking any measures to silence Khomeini that would have been or appeared to have been an exasperation of Iran’s already poor record on human rights.
[17] Kamrava, 35, 89.
[18] Ali M. Ansari, Modern Iran Since 1921: The Pahlavis and After (New York: Pearson Education Limited, 2003), 206. The full text of the Shah’s speech is reprinted in Kamrava, 135-37. The Shah used the speech to also reassert himself as a divine-right monarch.
[19] Ansari, 206.
[20] Ibid., 211.
[21] U.S. News and World Report, February 5, 1979. Source: LexisNexis Academic
[22] Ansari, 206. Khomeini asserted as much: “The measures taken so far to repress the movement of our people have all been the results of American intervention.” Islam and Revolution, 322.
[23] Asghar Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic, trans. by John O’Kane (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1998), 62.
[24] Sura 4:59. Cited in Ayatollah Khomeini, “The Necessity for Islamic Government.” In Lloyd Ridgeon, ed., Religion and Politics in Modern Iran: A Reader (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 213, fn.1.
[25] Kamrava, 34.
[26] C.M. Lake, “The Problems Encountered in Establishing an Islamic Republic in Iran 1979-1981,” Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies) 9, no. 2 (1982):143.
[27] John W. Cooper, The Theology of Freedom: The Legacy of Jacques Maritain and Reinhold Niebuhr (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1985), 3.
[28] Ali Rahnema and Farhad Nomani, The Secular Miracle: Religion, Politics & Economic Policy in Iran (New Jersey: Zed Books, Ltd., 1990), 19.
[29] Tenth day of Muharram on the Islamic calendar.
[30] “Necessity for Islamic Government,” 197-200, 213, fn. 3. Editor’s introduction.
[31] Winfried Corduan, Neighboring Faiths: A Christian Introduction to World Religions (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1998), 83-84.
[32] “Necessity for Islamic Government,” 203. Khomeini was most likely referring to the Baha’is.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Islam and Revolution, 327.
[35] Theda Skocpol, “Rentier State and Shi’a Islam in the Iranian Revolution,” Theory and Society 11, no. 3 (May 1982): 277.
[36] Rahnema and Nomani, 21.
[37] Imam Khomeini, Governance of the Jurist (Velayat-e Faqeeh): Islamic Government, trans. by Hamid Algar (Tehran: Iran Chamber Society), 34.
[38] “Necessity for Islamic Government,” 202.
[39] Ibid., 204.
[40] Ibid. “Sunna” or “Sunnah” refers to tradition.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid., 205-06. Schirazi notes how Khomeini, during the war with Iraq, circumvented legalistic adherence to the one-fifth tax in order to raise the extra funds necessary to conduct the war. See Schirazi, 67.
[43] Baqer Moin, Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 84. Khomeini argued that since religion and politics were united in the days of Mohammad, they should be now as well. Islam and Revolution, 38.
[44] “Necessity for Islamic Government,” 204.
[45] Ibid., 202.
[46] Islam and Revolution, 37.
[47] Governance of the Jurist, 53.
[48] Islam and Revolution, 33.
[49] Ibid., 295.
[50] Ibid., 296.
[51] Ibid., 298.
[52] See Article 3 of the Constitution for the principles of national independence. Available at www.iranchamber.com
[53] “Necessity for Islamic Government,” 207. Kufr refers specifically to a government based upon the rejection of divine guidance. A ruler of such government is an instance of taghut.
[54] Islam and Revolution, 332.
[55] “Necessity for Islamic Government,” 208.
[56] Islam and Revolution, 37.
[57] “Necessity for Islamic Government,” 206-07.
[58] Ibid., 208.
[59] Ibid., 209.
[60] Rahnema and Nomani, 25.
[61] Islam and Revolution, 266.
[62] Ibid., 284.
[63] “Necessity for Islamic Government,” 206-07.
[64] Islam and Revolution, 127.
[65] Ibid., 27-28.
[66] Ibid., 128. emphasis added.
[67] The destruction of Israel was one of the most urgent goals of the Islamic Republic. Schirazi, 69.
[68] Ibid., 68.
[69] Rahnema and Nomani, 4.
[70] Islam and Revolution, 38. Khomeini contended that “the ratio of Qur’anic verses concerned with the affairs of society to those concerned with ritual worship is greater than a hundred to one.” Islam and Revolution, 29.
[71] Ibid., 38.
[72] Skocpol, 274.
[73] Naraghi , 28.
[74] Islam and Revolution, 126.
[75] Ibid., 129, 133.
[76] Ibid., 146.
[77] Naraghi, 15.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Islam and Revolution, 138.
[80] Ibid., 139.
[81] Ibid., 147.
[82] Moin, 91.
[83] “Necessity for Islamic Government,” 27.
[84] “Governance of the Jurist,” 29.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid., 32.
[87] Islam and Revolution, 129-30.
[88] “Governance of the Jurist,” 34.
[89] Ibid., 47.
[90] Ibid., 46.
[91] Islam and Revolution, 343.
[92] Ibid., 342.
[93] Schirazi, 9.
[94] Islam and Revolution, 265
[95] Schirazi, 27.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Ibid., 24-27.
[98] Ibid., 27. See also 293.
[99] Ibid., 30.
[100] Ibid., 55.
[101] Available at http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution_ch01.php. emphasis added.
[102] Ibid. emphasis added.
[103] Available at http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution_ch08.php. emphasis added.
[104] The qualifications for the Leader are spelled out in Article 109.
[105] Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, former student of Khomeini and president of Iran, became one such protester. He was dismissed as president 1981 in part because of his resistance to velayat-e faqih. Schirazi, 71.
[106] Schirazi, 61, 76. Schirazi does point out that there were in practice some limits of the obedience accorded to Khomeini. Schirazi, 80-81. The word “absolute” (motlaqe) was inserted in the Constitution prior to velayat-e faqih. Ansari, 243.
[107] Schirazi, 150.
[108] Ansari, 243.
[109] Schirazi, 1-5, 8-21, 52-55, 61-81.
[110] Lake, 162.
[111] Schirazi, 303.