The Problem of Evil, Briefly Considered
Much of what passes for objections to the Christian faith can be summarized under what is known as the “problem of evil.” When it comes right down to it, this might be at the core of most objections to the existence of God: How can God and evil co-exist? How could a good and powerful God allow so much suffering? These are real, heart-felt questions that Christians should take seriously and seek to answer.
The argument can be put in terms similar to this:
1. If God is all good, he would destroy evil
2. If God is all powerful, he could destroy evil
3. But evil is not destroyed
4. Therefore, there is no such God.
The problem of evil is really two-fold. First, it is a PHILOSOPHICAL problem: How do we reconcile the existence of an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God with the existence of evil? Second, the problem of evil is an EXISTENTIAL problem. Most of us have personally dealt with some really tough situations in life, situations in which there seems to be no irredeemable quality to the evil that we encountered. When a person is going through intense suffering, they are usually not looking for a philosophical treatise but are more in need of pastoral care. Again, this is the difference between the intellectual and emotional responses to evil. The focus here will be on the intellectual or philosophical response to the problem, an exercise that can be conducted even in abstraction from real life evils suffered in the real world.
Moreover, within the context of the philosophical inquiry, another distinction should be made, that between the LOGICAL problem and the EVIDENTIAL problem. Concerning the logical problem, objectors used to charge that Christianity held to contradictory premises when it simultaneously affirmed that God is love, God is powerful, and that evil really exists (unlike some religions that claim that evil is an illusion). But even atheist philosopher of religion William Rowe has admitted that no one has succeeded in demonstrating that theism is logically inconsistent in this regard.
Concerning the evidentialist problem, the main issue is the distinction between INSCRUTABLE evil and GRATUITOUS evil. R. Douglas Geivett explains: “Inscrutable evil is evil whose moral justification is beyond our (present) understanding. Gratuitous evil is evil that, as a matter of fact, occurs in the absence of any morally justifying reason.” As Geivett also points out, most objectors are wise enough to shy away from any bold proclamations that the existence of actually gratuitous evil can be demonstrated, and instead opt for the more appropriately subtle objection over the appearance of gratuitous evil. But even then, the objector must assume on his part powers of cognition that are, strangely enough, quite God-like, including the power to comprehensively understand the limits of moral justification for the permission of certain evils. How does the objector KNOW that God does not have a morally sufficient reason for allowing the evils that exist? How does the objector KNOW that God does NOT in fact restrain evil in such a way that sinful man is not nearly as corrupt and evil as he could be? It’s probably fair to say that only an omniscient being can really make such determinations. The objector should be more cautious in claiming the existence of even apparently gratuitous evil.
Let’s go back to the original argument for a moment. First of all, is it really the case that a God that is all-good would destroy evil? I think it is fair to say “yes.” Second, is it true that an all-powerful God could destroy evil? Again, I think the answer is an unequivocal “yes.” Third, does evil now exist? Contra some philosophies and religions, Christianity does not shy away from or deny the real existence of evil. Yes, evil does exist, and to call the brokenness and suffering of this world anything less is to trivialize the harsh experiences of millions and millions of people and even animals.
But does it follow from these three premises, God is good, God is powerful, yet evil exists, that such a God does not in fact exist? Of course it does not. The exclusion of one small word in premise #3 makes all the difference in the world: “yet.” The fact that an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God has not YET destroyed evil does not mean that (1) evil will not someday be destroyed or (2) that such a God does not exist. While it may feed the psychology of the atheist who wants to believe that there is no such God, the argument is a true non-sequitor. What if the final defeat of evil were to take place five minutes from now? A day from now? Six months from now? Twenty years from now? The fact that some evils are inscrutable inasmuch as we cannot always discern a morally justifiable purpose in them, or the fact that our timetable for the final defeat of evil is different from God’s timetable are really not good reasons for believing that the God of the Bible does not exist.
To be sure, what I have said thus far barely even scratches the surface of what could be written about the Christian response to the problem of evil in a mere ten-page journal article. But I want to summarize a few points in closing so as to try and head off some easily-anticipated confusion.
1. Evil is real – but evil is not a “thing.” Evil is a “privation,” or a “departure from the way things ought to be.” This means that the person who objects to God’s existence because of the co-existence of evil must be able to give an account of “the way things ought to be” in a world that, by his own admission, exists with and for no purpose at all. Good luck. In reality, the objector’s argument from evil betrays his implicit knowledge of God as the ultimate standard of moral goodness, often coupled with a rage against that God for daring to make moral demands on his own life. I throw that one in for free.
2. To say that omnipotence means “God can do anything” is naïve and ignorant. God cannot do anything; he can do anything that is possible to do. God cannot create an uncreated being; God cannot make a square circle; God cannot create a rock too big for him to lift. And God cannot make a MORAL universe with free creatures in which there is no option for morally bad (evil) choices. An all-powerful God could have created a world of vegetation alone; but such would not be a MORAL universe. An all-powerful God could have created a world of automatons; but such would not be a MORAL universe. But an all-powerful God, logically speaking, could NOT create a MORAL universe in which MORAL creatures had no option to be MORAL or IMMORAL anymore than an uncaused, self-existent being can commit suicide.
3. I’ve NEVER met a person who objected to God on the basis of evil that was willing to be the first in line to forfeit his own moral freedom. The person who objects to God on such a basis almost never sees the evil that lurks in his own heart.
4. There is no such thing as “the sum of human suffering.” Each person experiences their own suffering. There is no “collective suffering” anymore than a person living in Dallas experiences 308 degree heat just because it’s 102 in Mesquite, 100 in Plano, and 106 in Carrollton.
5. It is entirely human to cry out to God in the face of evil. In fact, when such occurs, then evil has served at least one eternally meaningful purpose. So the ultimate question when it comes to evil is quite personal: Will you be like Job’s wife, “Curse God and die.” Or will you be like Job himself, “Shall we indeed accept good from God, and shall we not accept adversity?…Naked I came from my mother’s womb, and naked shall I return there. The Lord gave, and the Lord has taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord.”
Works Cited
R. Douglas Geivett, “God and the Evidence of Evil,” in Reasons for Faith: Making a Case for the Christian Faith, eds. Norman L. Geisler and Chad V. Meister, Wheaton: Good News Publishers, 2007, 249-268.